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IDENTITY OF PARTIES
Appellant: Larry Ray Reeves
Resondents: Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., a New York
Corporation;
Eli Lilly & Co., an Indiana corporation;
Gerald R. Moress, M.D.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the lower court err in denying appellant Larry Ray
Reeves the opportunity to conduct further discovery pursuant to Motion
and an Affidavit submitted under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to
granting respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment, thereby violating
legal principles of summary judgment and depriving appellant Reeves
of his constitutional right to legal redress of his injuries?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Larry Ray Reeves seeks review of a ruling from the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick presiding, granting respondents' Motions
for Summary Judgment- as to all claims asserted by appellant in a
complex products strict liability and medical malpractice action.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a complex products strict liability and medical
malpractice action wherein appellant Larry Ray Reeves seeks damages
from respondents CIBA-Geigy Inc., manufacturer of the drug Tegretol,
Eli Lilly & Co., manufacturer of the drug Phenobarbital, and
Dr. Gerald E. Moress, a physician who prescribed and administered
these drugs to appellant as treatment for a seizure disorder, for
injuries appellant Reeves suffered from these drugs, including thirddegree, full-thickness chemical burns over 66.6% of his skin;
damage to organs, tissue and muscles; severe, extensive and
permanent scarring and disfigurement; extreme physical and mental
pain and anguish; loss of earnings and earning capacity; repeated
hospitalizations and medical expenses to date of approximately
$220,000.00.
Specifically, appellant Reeves claims that respondents Geigy
and Lilly are strictly liable and/or negligent in their design,
testing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, labeling and
promotion of the drugs Tegretol and Phenobarbital, particularly
in failing to provide adequate warnings of the adverse side
effects suffered by appellant Reeves, thereby causing him to
suffer the injuries described above.
Appellant Reeves also claims that respondent Dr. Moress is
strictly liable and/or negligent in prescribing, marketing,
distributing and promoting the use of Tegretol and/or Phenobar-
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bital to him for treatment of his seizure disorder, failing to
warn appellant Reeves of the possible adverse side effects from
the use of Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital, including the side
effects suffered by appellant Reeves, failing to obtain
appellant's informed consent to the administration of these
drugs, and in failing to adequately monitor his use of these
drugs, thereby causing the alleged injuries to appellant
Reeves.
On February 8, 1984, appellant Reeves filed his Complaint
and demand for jury trial. (R. 2-23) Respondent Lilly filed
a motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction (R. 40-49),
appellant responded (R. 49-53), and Respondent Lilly finally
stipulated to jurisdiction.(R. 70-72)
Respondent Dr. Moress answered on March 2, 1984, (R. 32-39)
and respondent Geigy filed its Answer on April 13, 1984. (R. 84-96)
In their Answers, respondents denied liability to appellant
under the strict products liability and negligence theories
asserted by appellant, and alleged numerous affirmative defenses
to appellant's claims. (R. 32-39; 84-96)
On April 9, 1984, appellant Reeves commenced discovery, by
interrogatories and requests for production of documents,
regarding all facets of the manufacturing, testing, inspection,
marketing, distribution, labeling and promotion of the drugs Tegretol
and Phenobarbital, which caused appellant's injuries (R. 78-83),
and defendant Dr. Moress's conduct in relation to the prescription,
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marketing/ distribution, promotion, administration and monitoring
of Tegretol and/or Pheobarbital to appellant Reeves. (R. 75-77)
The foregoing discovery resulted in the production of
several thousand pages of documents; the filing of numerous objections to interrogatories and requests for production of
documents which appellant's counsel/ together with respondents'
counsel/ spent considerable time and effort trying to resolve.
During the Spring and Summer of 1984/ appellant also
responded to respondents' interrogatories (R. 98-99; 116-117;
129-131) and the parties conducted numerous depositions. (R. 100-103;
113-114; 127-128)
Although appellant Reeves served his First Set of
Interrogatories to respondent Lilly on April 9,

1984/ (R. 81-83)/

respondent Lilly did not file its answers and objections until
August 27, 1984. (R. 132-133)
In December/ 1984, the parties conducted a second round of
depositions, including the deposition of appellant Reeves and certain
physicians at the University Medical Center/ who were involved in the
treatment of appellant Reeves' injuries. (R. 136-137)
In January/ 1985, the mother of appellant Reeves was deposed
(R. 140-144) and appellant Reeves served a second round of
requests for production of documents seeking information
regarding the knowledge of respondents Geigy and Lilly of adverse
reactions to Tegretol and Phenobarbital. (R. 145-154)
On April 5/ 1985, respondent Geigy produced approximately
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2,000 documents in response to appellant's request and objected
to producing numerous documents requested by appellant.
In May, 1985, appellant Reeves also requested information
concerning adverse drug reactions to Tegretol and Phenobarbital
from the United States Food and Drug Administration and in July
and August, 1985, received several thousand computer printout pages
of data concerning adverse drug reactions to the drugs Tegretol
and Phenobarbital.
On February 25, 1986, Judge Frederick, pursuant to his
usual practice of reviewing the status of cases pending more
than one year, conducted a conference with counsel for the
parties concerning the status of the case. (R. 157) At that time,
appellant's counsel indicated to the Court that appellant was
still involved in the completion of discovery and could not
certify readiness for trial before sixty days or longer, due
to previous commitments on other matters scheduled for trial
and hearing, and the need to complete discovery in the action.
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the Court continued
the matter for further status report in 60 days. (R. 157)
Appellant was still in the process of digesting and crosschecking the information concerning adverse drug reactions
received from respondents and the F.D.A. when, on April 28,
1986, respondent Dr. Moress filed his motion for summary judgment
(R. 175-177), based upon two grounds: (1) that Dr. Moress
allegedly complied with existing standards of care in treating
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appellant Reeves; and (2) that Tegretol and Pheobarbital, the
two drugs prescribed by respondent Moress for appellant Reeves,
were allegedly not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered
by appellant Reeves.
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, respondent
Dr. Moress submitted affidavits of two local physicians, Joel
M. Thompson, M.D., and Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., (R. 158-165),
generally stating that, in their respective opinions, respondent Moress's treatment of appellant Reeves was appropriate.
Dr. Swinyer also stated that he did not believe that the drugs
Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital administered to appellant Reeves
by respondent Dr. Moress were the cause of appellant Reeves's
injuries.
Respondent Dr. Moress also filed a memorandum in support
of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 166-174) which included
characterizations of fact and conclusions of fact purportedly
supported by references to depositions of appellant Reeves's
mother, Alma Cook, and appellant Reeves's treating physician,
Dr. Glen Warden. (R. 167-169)
On April 30, 1986, respondents Geigy and Lilly filed their
joint Motion for Summary Judgment, relying solely on the grounds
previously asserted by respondent Moress and upon the memorandum
and affidavits submitted by respondent Dr. Moress in support of
his Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 180-185)

6

Prior to receiving respondents' Motions for Summary
Judgment, appellant Reeves had sought expert medical opinions
concerning appellant's claims against respondent Dr. Moress for
medical malpractice and appellant's claim that his injuries were
caused by Tegretol and/or Phenobarbital, the drugs manufactured by
respondents Geigy and Lilly and prescribed to appellant Larry Reeves
by respondent Dr. Moress. The expert physicians consulted
by appellant's counsel expressed the need for further information
before they could render the opinions to oppose those stated by
respondents' physicians in their affidavits supporting respondents'
Motions for Summary Judgment.
Thus, on May 6, 1986, appellant's counsel filed a Motion To
Extend Discovery and For Continuance of Hearing on Defendants' Motion
For Summary Judgment, requesting additional time for discovery
to oppose respondents' summary judgment motions. (R.186-187)
Appellant's counsel also filed an Affidavit In Opposition
To Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P.,

averring that appellant was unable to submit affidavits in opposition
to the affidavits Submitted in support of respondents' motions without
further discovery which appellant requested the opportunity to
conduct. Appellant's counsel further indicated that certain delays
in completing discovery had occurred because of previously
scheduled court matters and were in no way attributable to
any lack of diligence on the part of appellant Reeves. (R. 188-190)
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Respondents filed no objection to appellant's motion for
additional discovery and filed no objection or motion to strike
the Affidavit of appellant's undersigned counsel under Rule 56(f)
prior to the hearing on respondents' motions for summary judgment
and appellant's motion to continue discovery on June 2, 1986.
At that time, following oral argument on the motions, Judge
Frederick granted respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment,
denied appellant's Motion To Extend Discovery and dismissed
this action "with prejudice", despite the affidavit of appellant's
counsel filed in good faith pursuant to Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P.,
appellant's reasonable request for additional discovery to
properly oppose the motions, and appellant's argument that
the evidence offered by respondents in support of their Motions
for Summary Judgment did not entitle respondents to be granted
summary judgment against appellant Larry Reeves.
The Court did not make render any written findings, conclusions
of law, or opinion regarding the basis for its decision to grant
respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment and no record was made
of the oral argument on the Motions or the Court's expressed reasons
for granting the Motions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in denying appellant Reeves the opportunity
to conduct further discovery pursuant to Motion and an Affidavit filed
under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to granting respondents' Motions
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For Summary Judgment, where respondents never objected to, or moved
strike, appellant's Motion or Affidavit prior to the hearing on
the Motions, and appellant's requests for further discovery to oppo
the Motions for Summary Judgment were made in good faith and were
reasonable in light of the nature and circumstances of the action,
thereby violating legal principles of summary judgment, and
depriving appellant Reeves of his constitutional right to redress
of injuries.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT FURTHER DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f), PRIOR TO THE ENTRY
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THEREBY VIOLATING LEGAL
PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DEPRIVING
APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL
REDRESS OF INJURIES
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-313 (Utah 1984),
relying on its prior decision in Strand v.Associated
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (1977),
this Court reaffirmed the duty of lower courts to permit a party
to conduct additional discovery pursuant to the filing of an
affidavit under Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., prior to granting a motion
for summary judgment
Where, however, the party opposing summary
judgment timely presents his affidavit under
Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he is presently
unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits, he
directly and forthrightly invokes the trial
court's discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking
in merit, the motion should be liberally
9

treated. Exercising sound discretion the
trial court determines whether the stated
reasons are adequate.
Emphasis supplied.
This Court has also indicated that when an affidavit is
filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and the
movant does not object to, or move to strike, the affidavit
before it is admitted, the movant waives the right to complain
that the affidavit is not sufficient and waives his opposition
to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. Strange v. Qstlund,
594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979); Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983).
In this case, as in all cases premised on theories of
products strict liability and negligence, the threshold issue is
whether the product in question caused the plaintiff's injury. If
the product in question has been the subject of litigation for
sometime, the fact that the product in question caused the
injury suffered may be well established, and extensive
discovery may be unnecessary. However, this is not always
true .
As this Court observed in Berry By And Through Berry
v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1975), long
delayed health hazards from prescription drugs and chemicals
can cause disease and death many years after exposure. Litigation concerning the injuries inflicted from such diverse products
as asbestos, the Dalkon Shield birth control device, and the
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drug DES, graphically demonstrate that a decade of litigation
may be required to discover the evidence necessary to establish, by
competent evidence, the causative link between a product and
a specific injury.
Why? Generally speaking, because the information showing that
a particular product causes a particular injury is known only to the
manufacturer of the product, and the manufacturer does not want
to reduce its profits by publicizing the fact that its product causes
certain injuries, or face the possibility that a government agency
may require the product to be recalled and modified, or be withdrawn
from the market.
In order to avoid disclosure of information that its
product causes particular injuries, manufacturers may simply
ignore reports of injuries, fail to report injuries to public
agencies despite their legal duty to do so, fail to conduct
proper tests and studies to verify whether certain injuries
alleged to be caused by a particular product are, in fact,
caused by the product, or simply conceal the facts from the
public.
In the event that manufacturers do not publically disclose
injuries from their products, persons who are injured by them
are put in the position of having to bear the expense and trouble
of obtaining the raw data which shows that the manufacturers are
aware that certain injuries are being caused by their product, by
virtue of reports from people using the product or the physicians
11

who are treating them.
After obtaining the data, the injured person must then find
medical experts who can interpret the data, perform tests and
form opinions as to whether a particular product causes a particular
injury. This process, when undertaken in the context of litigation, is
time consuming, expensive, and often requires several years to accompl
In this case, the record indicates that appellant Reeves had
conducted vigorous discovery, that additional discovery was reasonably
required and being pursued by appellant at the time respondents
filed their Motions for Summary Judgment, that appellant made a timely
Motion To Extend Discovery and filed a timely and appropriate Affidavi
pursuant to Rule 56(f), verifying appellant's need to conduct further
discovery to properly oppose respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment
The record in this case also reveals that respondents never
objected to appellant's motion to extend discovery and that
respondents never objected to, or moved to strike, the Affidavit of
appellant's counsel indicating the need for further discovery
prior to the hearing on respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment.
Based upon the foregoing, appellant Reeves submits that
the lower court's action in denying him the right to conduct
further discovery to oppose respondent's Motions for Summary
Judgment violated appellant's rights pursuant to Rule 56(f).
In addition, appellant Reeves contends that the lower
court's action in denying appellant further discovery to
oppose respondents' motions for summary judgment, deprived
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appellant Reeves of his constitutional right to legal redress
against respondents for his injuries.
Article I, Sections 7, of the Utah Constitution guarantees
that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."

Article I, Section 11,

declares that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due
course of law" for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation."
In Berry By And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this Court relied upon this consitutional
provision in declaring Section 3 of the Utah Products Liability Act,
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-1, et. seq. (1953), unconstitutional
insofar as it barred claims for injuries from products which were
asserted "more than six years after the date of initial purchase
for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of
manufacture of a product." In so holding, this Court exhaustively
reviewed the historical antecedents of Article I, Section 11, noting
the "fundamental obligation of government to provide reasonable
remedies for wrongs done persons." 717 P.2d at 675-681.
In the instant case, the lower court, in denying appellant
Reeves the opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery to oppose
respondents' motions for summary judgment prior to granting the
motions, deprived appellant Reeves of his right to legal
redress against respondents for his injuries as arbitrarily
as the products liability statute of repose struck down by this
Court in Berry.

Summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions
and inferences which, viewed in the light most favorable to the
losing side, establish that "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law." Geneva Pipe Co* v.
S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986) This principle
of summary judgment assumes, and fundamental notions of fairness
as embodied in Article I, Sections 7 and 11, of the Utah Constitution
demand that the party opposing summary judgment be afforded
a fair and adequate opportunity, under the facts and circumstances
of the particular case, to conduct the discovery necessary to
adduce facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment,
before his constitutional right to legal redress can be forever
foreclosed, as occurred in this case.
CONCLUSION
The lower court committed reversible error and deprived
appellant Reeves of his fundamental, constitutional legal
right to redress of injuries, when it granted respondents' Motions
for Summary Judgment without affording appellant Reeves a reasonable
opportunity to conduct discovery pursuant to a timely Motion to
Extend Discovery and an Affidavit filed, in good faith, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P., in order to properly
oppose the motions.
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In consequence of the points and authorities set forth
herein, appellant Larry Ray Reeves respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the summary judgments entered by the
lower court/ and remand this case with instructions to the lower
court to permit appellant Reeves a reasonable time for discovery
to oppose respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment.
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/
1987.
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